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Abstract
This thesis will trace the United States’ development of unmanned warfare from
its initial use in the World Wars through the Cold War to its final maturation in the War
on Terror. The examination will provide a summary of unmanned warfare’s history, its
gradual adoption, and concerns regarding the proliferation of drones use to understand
the emphasis on unmanned weapons in the American Military. In each phase of
development, a single program will be focused on to highlight special areas of interest in
the modern day. Finally, the modern era of unmanned systems will focus on the growing
integration of new weapon systems which no longer fulfill niche roles in the armory but
act as fully vetted frontline combatants. Brought together, this examination will show
drones have earned their place as integral tools in the American military inventory as
faithful defenders of democracy.
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Perception is Everything: Repairing the Image of American Drone Warfare
The future of American military supremacy is growing increasingly dependent on
the continued dominance of unmanned warfare. The flagship of this rapidly expanding
arena is the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), which has taken center stage in the Global
War on Terror under the internationally popular Obama Administration.1 The inherent
risk of deploying UAVs in combat is that the global perception will turn against them if
they are seen as intelligent killing machines capable of taking life without the input of
human morality. This fear is already taking shape with some policy commentators who
believe the adoption of these faceless terminators will disconnect the American military
from the “painful exercise” of taking human life while decision makers are shielded from
“the inevitability of death and destruction” of their own forces, which has long been a
motivating factor in bringing conflicts to a conclusion.2 On the home-front, a majority of
Americans (approximately 65%) remain supportive of the technology due to its
protection of American lives.3 However, other countries are largely opposed to the
increasing use of drones and have begun to act on their fears to counter American
interests.4 To maintain the security of the American people, the history of UAVs in
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combat must be taught to the global community to normalize their use and ensure the
continued growth of the weapons in the future.
Much of the consternation in the world is due to a lack of information about the
history of their new defenders, naturally leading to their fear of the unknown. Yet the
perceived reality could not be further from the truth of the U.S. military’s long tradition
of unmanned warfare. While the creation of a solution to the world’s concerns will be an
arduous journey, a foundation of trust must be laid before drones’ current involvement in
modern conflicts can be evaluated with any certainty. Once accomplished, the discussion
on current events can be made with an eye bent towards improving their use rather than
deciding if drones must still fight to earn their place on the battlefield.
Flyover of the Past
UAVs have been developing nearly as long as mankind has flown the skies, with
the first attempts at creating radio-controlled airplanes starting in the late 1910s.5 From
these humble beginnings as little more than guided bombs attempting to prove the
viability of the concept, UAVs faced a winding road to adoption by the U.S. military as
the promise of the technology competed against economic realities demanding tangible
breakthroughs. Yet in the late 1930s, when the clouds of war gathered over Europe once
more, America again turned to UAVs to save the lives of its pilots as they struggled to
break through Nazi Germany’s air defenses. While not a great strategic success, the
fruits of this labor paid off in World War II with Operation Aphrodite solidifying the
place of drones as a viable area of research within the minds of military elite and bought
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the concept time to mature through the opening years of the Cold War.6 By the time of
the Vietnam War, when American forces were caught between a tenacious enemy and an
unsupportive homeland, drones were able to provide vital reconnaissance to the Air Force
by taking the place of vulnerable manned aircraft on dangerous missions.7 However,
with the withdrawal of American forces from Southeast Asia, Congressional budget
committees once again closed drone research until the conflicts of the 1990s “placed an
increased importance on aerial surveillance and dynamic forms of targeting.”8
Not until the Gulf War showcased the power of precision guided munitions
(PGMs) did the idea of machines fighting side-by-side the living earn a stable place in the
inventory of the U.S. military. With this most recent piece of the modern combat drone’s
evolution securing a place for them in active combat zones, UAVs have entered a golden
age in their history, with systems operating in every sector of the battlespace.9 The
current issues faced by the drone force are no longer focused on preserving its right to
survive. Rather, there are now a host of questions regarding the creation of a robust
logistical chain to sustain them, and a great debate rages on how to properly utilize the
weapons in the 21st century. These twin problems of how to properly integrate this
“disruptive technology” into the arsenal of democracy have left the military searching for
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the best means of securing continued public support, so it may fully exploit the
advantages of unmanned aircraft in the defense of the nation.10
As drones continue to draw more of the global community’s attention during
military action and America’s armed forces find new ways to benefit from the everincreasing capabilities of UAVs, the consensus on drone warfare will likely continue to
polarize giving rise to further calls for the curtailing their use. To preserve the
unmatched potential of these weapons and ameliorate the public’s fear of their dangers,
an era-by-era analysis is necessary to acquaint both the American people and global
community with UAVs historic service alongside the U.S. military.
Drones Search for a Home
First World War: Aerial Torpedoes
As the United States was drawn into the First World War, the federal government
attempted to catch up the fledging military to those of Europe by harnessing the scientific
and intellectual capabilities that had propelled America through the Industrial Revolution.
Formed into a series of war boards which directed the production of military equipment,
titans of research and industry became critical members of the fight to make the world
safe for democracy. Among these early twentieth century warriors was Charles
Kettering, the head of industrial research at General Motors.11 In an effort to overcome
the heavily fortified static defenses of the Western Front, Kettering began developing the

10

Bernard Rostker, Building Toward an Unmanned Air System Training Strategy (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2014), 7.
Jimmy Stamp, “Unmanned Drone have been Around since World War I,” Smithsonian
Magazine: World War I: 100 Years Later, February 12, 2013.
11

PERCEPTION IS EVERYTHING

8

first UAVs, affectionately nicknamed the “Kettering Bug,” for the U.S. military.
Designed to be a simple, cheap, and precise alternative to increasingly dangerous manned
bombing raids, the most basic materials were used as a cost saving measure due to the
intentional design of the Aerial Torpedoes’ mission demanding the sacrifice of the
aircraft as it crashed into the enemy.12
Equipped with hand-wound control systems to keep them on a pre-planned flight
path and an explosive payload of 180 pounds, the research program showed the promise
needed for full production to be approved. However, the end of the Great War came
before the Bugs could reach the front lines, and America returned to her isolationist
tradition bringing many of its wartime projects to an end, including the Aerial Torpedo.13
However, this early drone program opened the door for future UAV research and soon
the U.S. military sought to test more innovative designs. Through the early years of the
inter-war period, the quest for a reliable remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) continued, but
“one technological bottle neck after another emerged” to stand in the way of progress. 14
Eventually, the Great Depression forced budget cuts to developmental programs that
were failing to meet their goals on time. The Aerial Torpedo project found itself in the
crosshairs of these budget saving measures pushing unmanned research to the side until
the economy recovered and the rise of Nazi Germany triggered renewed interest in war
preparation.15
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Second World War: Project Aphrodite
In 1938, RPVs finally broke through the technological bottlenecks with the first
successful landing of an unmanned monoplane and captured the attentions, and
pocketbooks, of the military once again.16 This revived development began to pay
dividends during the Second World War and finally advanced RPVs to the point of
combat viability. Under the guidance of General Carl Spaatz, the “overall commander of
U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces,” and General James “Jimmy” Doolittle created a more
advanced version of aerial torpedoes to augment the bombing efforts of manned units.
Called Operation Aphrodite, the program took “war-weary” B-17s and repurposed them
as high-tech descendants of the Kettering Bug. Piloted through take-off by a volunteer
crew who would bail as soon as the aircraft reached a sustainable altitude, a chaser
airplane would follow the Aphrodite remotely guiding the plane on a terminal impact
course with potential targets.17
However, when used in its intended role of striking hardened targets too
dangerous for manned missions, the drone strike craft were abject failures, with only a
handful of the RPVs actually reaching their target and even fewer achieving meaningful
impacts. In response to this failure, General Doolittle advocated for the remaining planes
to be turned “loose to land all over Germany so that the Germans would be just as afraid
of our war weary planes on account of not knowing just where they are going to hit, as
are the people in England from the buzz bombs and rockets.”18 This shift from a
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precision strike tool to general destructive weapon system marked a terrifying but
necessary conclusion to the military’s outlook on RPVs. Although it did not benefit the
overall strategy for the bombing campaign in Europe, drones were no longer looked at as
wonder weapons augmenting a larger mission.19 They were now positioned to develop
into an independent system of weapons capable of undertaking a great host of missions,
tailor-made to their specific strengths without worrying about the need to fill the same
roles as manned systems.
End of an Era: Beginning of the Cold War
After World War II came to a close, the attention of military procurement shifted
to the task of containing the Soviet Union. Knowing it could not match the Soviets in a
direct confrontation on the ground, the U.S. military worked to build force multipliers
which would allow them to match the overwhelming numbers of the Warsaw Pact’s
armies.20 A primary focus of this development was the creation of precision guided
munitions to replace the imprecise carpet bombardments of World War II. This provided
two benefits to the development of the automated force. The first being the additional
need for aerial photography to provide better targeting information for the new weapons.
The second further refined the radio control systems which guided unmanned flight.
Through this embryonic era of drone warfare, the primary concern of the program
was ensuring drones had a place on the battlefield. The initial goals for the new UAV
were low and only sought to bring the technology onto the battlefield as one-shot
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solutions to temporary problems. However, the precision needed to turn the suicidal
devices into effective weapons was long in development. Once the technology had
caught up to the dreams of the military, research quickly turned to shaping the new
weapons into sustainable platforms to manage a wider range of missions, many which
served as the precursors to the modern drone’s mission of Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR). These developments would be given opportunity to mature
during the Vietnam War.
Southeast Asian Containment: Lightning Bugs
In the initial stages of American involvement in Southeast Asia in the 1960s, the
U.S. government’s first priority was the containment of hostilities, leading to limits on
the amounts of boots on the ground. Yet the Air Force still needed to know how the
Communist North planned to defend itself from incoming air strikes. Strategic Air
Command (SAC) provided an answer for this issue in the form of the 4080th Strategic
Wing, a hybrid unit of unmanned surveillance systems and the venerable U-2
Dragonlady.21 Freshly equipped with the unmanned Ryan Model 147 Lightning Bug and
its human controlled DC-130 motherships, the men and machines of the 4080th were
deployed to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa and Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam.22 As the
newest model of unmanned aerial vehicle, the 147s were equipped for a host of mission
profiles. The most common included a camera suite designed to capture the positions of
anti-air defenses or document the damage caused by an airstrike. Other versions actively
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hunted surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites with “‘sniffer’ payloads,” ran interference with
“electronic countermeasure (ECM) packages that actively jammed SAM radars, or
[carried] pods that dispensed metallic chaff to passively jam radars.” Later wartime
developments would see 147s “transmit real-time TV images to a DC–130 mother ship
that loitered off the coast.”23
Set loose from their motherships, the eclectic swarm of 147s scoured the skies of
Vietnam, Laos, and China successfully completing thousands of missions against the
communist forces. Despite being the first en masse deployment of unmanned vehicles to
the battlefront, the 4080th was able to perform at exceptionally high level, recovering
about 85% of all drones sent out, including those shot down by enemy defenses.24 This
success was built on the foundations laid by Kettering’s Bugs and Aphrodite. Much like
the Bugs, the 147 was launched from a rail, albeit a flying one mounted beneath the
wings of its mothership, and was preprogrammed with a flight path over hostile
airspace.25 Upon completion of its task, the 147 was able to improve over its
predecessors’ terminal recovery program with a secondary remote piloting function
which would activate once a 147 was over friendly airspace. Rather than the simple
point-and-shoot controls of Aphrodite, the fine tuning of the intervening decades enabled
great enough control of the now remotely piloted vehicle to bring the intelligence
collected safely to the ground. As the war progressed, and more of Southern Vietnamese
territory became compromised, additional precautions were taken to ensure the safe
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recovery of the 147s’ precious cargo. The 4080th’s aircraft inventory was expanded to
include heavily modified CH-3 helicopters which acted as a flying arrestor cable,
snatching the parachute of the 147 before it ever touched the ground.26
Building Trust
With these combined improvements, the U.S. Air Force began to rely more
heavily on the unmanned aircraft program for surveillance of enemy positions and the
sheer volume of the required sortie rate could not be met by the small force of the 4080th.
In the summer of 1966, the Air Force reorganized the 4080th Strategic Wing as the 100th
Strategic Reconnaissance Wing to better integrate the aforementioned trio of flying
systems into an effective fighting unit.27 Now split into two separate squadrons, the 349th
Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (SRS) dedicated to manned U-2 operations and the
350th SRS strictly to unmanned operations, the 100th was ready and able to meet the
increasing demands of the East Asian theater, with peak performance coming in 1969,
flying 437 missions of all kinds.28 Much of this increase could be credited to activity on
the tense Korean Peninsula which threatened to open a second front in the Asian theater.
In April of 1969, North Korean fighters shot down an EC-121 in international waters
over the East China Sea killing all 31 crewmembers in an attempt to blind American
surveillance of their territory.29
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Unwilling to lose any more lives or further antagonize another communist power
in the East, the Pentagon ordered the cessation of all manned operations in the area.30
However, the Korean Peninsula could not be left unmonitored and the battle tested
unmanned machines were brought forth once again to augment the forces in the region.
Under the operational name Combat Dawn, the men of the 350th modified some of their
Lightning Bugs from their boom-and-zoom raid configuration into long endurance
platforms capable of maintaining lasting orbits around the East China Sea.31 This drastic
shift in operational capacity was accomplished by jerry-rigging the 147s with additional
drop-off fuel tanks and installing more efficient engines, allowing the newly christened
147TE/TFs to effectively operate in their expanded area of operations.32
Through this continual trial by fire, the Lightning Bugs met every challenge that
was thrown at them and passed with flying colors.33 The successes on the strategic level
of operations even paved the way for the recognition of unmanned vehicles’ potential in
the Tactical Air Command (TAC) to support its air superiority missions. The primary
desire of TAC was to provide a “loyal wingman” for their reconnaissance planes scouting
ahead of incoming strike groups. To this end, in late 1968 sixty-seven 147s equipped
with electronic counter measure pods and chaff dispensers were purchased by TAC.34
The intended purpose of these distractions was to fly directly into the teeth of enemy
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defenses, triggering their activation and drawing the first salvos of missile fire away from
the manned fighters. Once the enemy positions had revealed themselves, manned
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) fighters were to follow and eliminate the
now vulnerable and unarmed launch vehicles. However, this potentially revolutionary
breakthrough of manned and unmanned aircraft flying side-by-side into combat proved to
be too technically demanding to impact the rapidly concluding war in Vietnam in a
meaningful manner. With repeated setbacks during training that prevented the new unit
from entering the South East Asian Theater, the combat deployment of drones was once
again the target of post war budget cuts.35
Unwilling to risk the total loss of their drone program that occurred with the
cessation of previous wars, the budgetary rivals in SAC and TAC found themselves
reaching a mutually beneficial compromise.36 TAC adopted the SAC’s remaining
squadrons of Lightning Bugs and reformed them as the 11th Tactical Drone Squadron.
This provided justification for continued funding of experimental research in support of
the politically more attractive air superiority mission, while still allowing the Air Force to
retain the experience of its Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
personnel in case the SAC missions would need to be reactivated. Yet even through this
agreement, the Air Force was only able to sustain unmanned research until 1979 when
the stresses of the fractured political climate forced the military into soul-searching
downsizing.37 The failure of technology to produce high-profile results in the “loss” to a
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technically inferior North Vietnam brought the final chapter of early drone history to an
ignominious end with the shuttering of “all Defense Department drone activity until late
1981” when Congress reallocated funding to basic unmanned research once again as the
promise of drones taking the place of human beings in dangerous situations proved too
tempting to let rest for long.38
Drones Reborn
Humans Lead the Way
While the lessons learned through the first sixty years of drone warfare were
critical to the development of drone systems as a whole, one additional element was
needed for unmanned aircraft to make the jump from being a useful tool under forgiving
circumstances to a fully armed and operational weapons platform. While drones could be
piloted remotely, the distance created a communication delay which prevented the
effective use of unguided weapons, necessitating the development of a weapon which
could track a target on its own. The first major use of Precision Guided Munitions
(PGMs) was in Vietnam and the systems came into prominence during the First Gulf
War. 39 But due to the lack of deliberate development, the U.S. military only had a
limited number of drones in experimental squadrons, with none ready for operational use
leaving manned systems to carry the risk of demonstrating the uses of the new smart
weapons.40
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The first opportunity to implement the lessons of Vietnam was in the First Gulf
War. The Iraqi army which chose to present itself for battle against the newly equipped
U.S. military was ranked fourth in the world for raw manpower, well-equipped with
Soviet surplus armament, and hardened in battle during the recent Iraq-Iran conflict. The
expectation was for a bloody tank duel in the deserts of Kuwait.41 In truth, the war
proved to be a total rout of the Iraqi military. Before the coalition’s tanks raced across
the open deserts of Iraq, the US Air Force and its allies obliterated any potential for
organized resistance through a torrential forty days and nights of aerial bombardment.
Systematically, the coalition air strikes cut through the “five centers of gravity” which a
modern state relies upon to endure as a functioning entity. Destroying these five centers,
“leadership… infrastructure and supplies... transportation… the enemy population, [and]
the fielded military forces,” left the Iraqi state a broken husk unable to defend itself
against the advance of the coalition ground forces.42
The miniaturization of global positioning technology and maneuvering systems
cheap enough to mount on standard issue gravity bombs enabled this catastrophic
campaign. Combined, these new technologies permitted “remarkably few” instances of
civilian casualties despite the enormous weight of fire poured into the Iraqi positions.43
Learning from the lessons of Vietnam, the coalition air forces first targeted the command
and control networks of the Iraqi’s integrated air defense system (IADS), allowing their
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strike groups to operate freely in enemy airspace.44 Without the unmanned drones of
Vietnam which could trick the missile batteries into lighting up their positions with no
threat to human pilots, the US Air Force relied on F-117 stealth bombers and Wild
Weasel SEAD fighters to slip past the radar screen and knock out the command posts
with improved laser-guided bombs (LGBs) and high-speed anti-radiation missiles
(HARMs).
Next, came wave after wave of strike aircraft laden with PGMs guided by
software programmed to lock onto pilot designated targets and adjust their glide path
until impact, finally delivering on the potential the aerial torpedoes foretold. These
waves worked their way up the “concentric circles” of targets, destroying the Iraqi forces
in the field piece-by-piece. As more and more of the logistical arm backing the Iraqi
military was torn away, the increasingly exposed troops on the ground began to face their
own reckoning at the hands of the Coalition’s angels of death. Primarily targeting the
backbone of the Iraqi Army, the elite Republican Guard, air strikes again focused on
command and control elements of their targets, sowing confusion among the enlisted
ranks which hampered the deployment of highly concentrated armored elements. This
campaign served to shatter the morale of Iraqi forces and made the unfortunate survivors
easy prey for the onrushing liberation army.45
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Potential Realized
From this stunning victory, elements of the American military drew two
conclusions. First, that air power had at last matured to the point of being able to win
wars “cleanly” by bombing the enemy into submission and requiring only a limited
number of ground forces for short-term mop-up operations. Second, that this kind of war
was what the American military was meant to fight. American soldiers did not need to
spend a decade far from home trying to fight another government’s war which its own
people did not support. Furthermore, America’s soldiers could be shielded from the
horrors of combat by wrapping them in a cloak of technology evermore removed from
the battlefield. Rather than the repeated drawdowns seen after previous conflicts, the
United States renewed its interventionist policies on the world stage as it searched to use
its new restrained form of warfare to usher in a new age of peace. However, this promise
of true peace through human action was soon cast into the dust bin of history with the fall
of the Twin Towers and the commencement of the ongoing War on Terror.46
Between the 1991 Gulf War and the opening of the War on Terror in 2001, drones
became a prominent thought piece with several concurrent programs being developed to
enter the fighting force. Largely seen by procurement officers as a successor to the
Lighting Bug ISR role, limits to the initial procurement plans left few unmanned aircraft
ready to serve in the opening years of Afghanistan through the drive to Baghdad.47
However, as the demands of ongoing counter-insurgency operations began to grow ever
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higher, the U.S. military began to act on its revived fondness for technological solutions
to human problems.
Rapid Equipping Force: Rushing a Solution
As the primary service on the ground, the Army took the lead in securing new
equipment for the occupation forces in the Middle East. By activating the “Rapid
Equipping Force” and endowing it with the power to answer the needs of field
commanders with purchases of immense quantities of experimental gear directly from
defense contractors, the Army hoped to provide their forces in combat zones with
advanced technologies to hold the line against insurgents.48 One of the more common
requests was for more drone support. Requests of all types poured in, for small handheld units to serve individual platoons in need of an eye in the sky, to battalion requests
for consistent loitering scouts and artillery observers. The Air Force even requested
independent strike aircraft which could accompany larger units beyond the secured green
zones.49 Through this rapid purchase of drones directly by field commanders, the
military was able to field an effective force of ISR and strike aircraft in a timely fashion
by side-stepping the long procurement process traditionally associated with the adoption
of new systems.50 Rather than suffer the issues of repeated reorganization, inactivation,
and testing which delayed previous generations of drones from making it to the
battlefront, the commander in theater reported their needs directly to weapons
manufacturers who could craft solutions from preexisting equipment tailored to emerging
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needs. However, this rapid increase in the number and importance of UAVs created two
unfamiliar problems for the drone force.
The first issue is how the sudden growth can be maintained as the ever-increasing
numbers of systems strain the ability of the airframes to operate at the tempo needed to
meet the needs of the ground forces. Previous generations of drones had always been
short term solutions to specific problems, such as the Lightning Bugs in Southeast Asia,
and their lifespans cut short before the drone fleet was in need of an overhaul. Now,
drones had been moved to the forefront of military planning and need to be sustained for
much longer periods. The second issue is that drones are not only at the forefront of the
military’s attentions, but they are drawing the attention of the public for the first time in
their long history and face the piercing questions of public perception; subjecting their
use to a great debate over their ethical implications.
Burden of Success
Sustaining the Mission
The simpler of the two issues is the lack of a dedicated support structure for the
increasingly complex and valuable UAVs. Whereas most new weapons system replace
or augment already extant equipment allowing for funds to be reallocated to the new
more capable system, drones are filling roles that are only met by “good enough”
solutions forcing the creation of a new set of logistical networks to maintain a fully
functioning and independent weapon, leading to the view that drones are a “disruptive
technology.”51 Much of this disruption is caused by the sheer scale of their integration on
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the battlefront. In 2000, the Department of Defense operated less than fifty UAVs. By
2012 there were more than 7,100 fighting alongside American men and women.52 As
each of these systems comes online, the required logistical footprint of a unit goes up.
New maintenance staff are needed to keep the drones in the air; the unit must go through
additional training to understand the proper employment of the system; and the actual
pilots must be recruited and trained to operate it.53
Both the doctrine of the military and the increasing importance of aerial warfare
have adjusted the mindset of procurement planners to see UAVs as an absolutely vital
aspect of future warfare. But, there is a distinct lack of development in the support
structure off the field of battle. As one “senior civilian in the Department of the Air
Force” bluntly put it “when asked about the plan for all the personnel pouring into the Air
Force’s Predator and Reaper programs when the wars [Iraq and Afghanistan] wound
down, [he replied] ‘there is no plan.’”54 This admission reveals no plan for meeting
basing requirements of the airmen, nor integrating the aircraft into existing units, nor the
sustainment of an entire new class of equipment.
This lack of future planning has already begun to negatively impact the forces
being deployed. Even with the swarms of UAVs being purchased, the supply cannot
keep up with the demands of combatant commanders, forcing individual UAVs to fly
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double or even triple their planned sortie hours as standard practice.55 Without proper
support staff, this is burning through the lifespan of the airframes56. Furthermore, in a
survey of commanders asking for needed improvements for air bases operating drones,
the two common factors across the force were simple requests for the right to operate
their aircraft in their own airspace without filing for special permission just because it is
an unmanned flight and adequate storage space to house the drones during maintenance
times.57 The solution to this lack of material support requires extensive work in
construction programs, bureaucratic streamlining, and personnel recruitment. These
issues have already been highlighted and significant funding redirected to swiftly bring
answers. Far more damaging to the status of UAVs in the military is the media war being
waged against drone operations by insurgent forces and members of the global
community outraged by the sudden bursts of destruction unleashed in recent counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.
Targeted Killings
Without the general knowledge of the long history which has given UAVs the
ability to emerge onto the world stage today, the common view of drone warfare is
slowly turning against their continuing use. In the midst of the convoluted War on
Terror, this has resulted in an overabundance of coverage, but not for the primary,
uninteresting, mission of ISR. Rather, focus is on the far more clandestine role they have
played in the elimination of terrorist combatants outside of declared war zones. The first
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publicly avowed “killing by armed drones occurred in November 2001,” with the death
of Mohammed Ater, the top Al-Qaida military commander in Afghanistan at the hands of
a newly weaponized MQ-9 Predator.58 This action was not taken by a military drone but
by a secondary drone force under the direction of the CIA. Such paramilitary operations
act as the clandestine backstop for terrorists who escape the reach of the military forces
authorized to act within combat zones.
By reaching beyond the permitted range of the military, these drones perform a
vital task of denying terrorist groups precious time to regroup in safe havens outside the
bounds of a civilized government’s control. While it is difficult to get clear numbers (as
the official policy of the U.S. government is to deny any comment on the program), the
degradation of terrorist groups’ combat ability these strikes achieve cannot be denied.
From 2004-2012 the CIA executed about 350 drone strikes in Pakistan, killing about 9
people per strike, in Yemen 40-50 strikes eliminated somewhere between 300-1000
targets, and 3-9 strikes in Somalia resulted in 58-170 kills.59 In these totals, the vast
majority of dead were reported to be known terrorists and their associates.60 However, to
maintain a constant application of pressure on the fluid command chain prevalent among
the groups, less restrictive rules of engagement were adopted by the CIA. Called
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“signature strikes,” the policy targeted “patterns of life” which gave the appearance of
terrorist activity rather than acting on concrete intelligence.61
Though this tactic is undoubtedly effective at killing, the tradeoff for this
increased killing potential is that there are no friendly ground troops in the area to explain
the need for the strike to the local populace. The U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency field
manual warns “if military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the
people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents.”62 This is
occurring with the unsupported targeted killings and has allowed insurgent forces to
shape the narrative in the immediate area and around the world through increasingly
accessible internet media systems, turning many formerly complacent civilians into
active insurgents in response to the drone bombings.63 The end goal of these targeted
killings is to impair the operational capacity of insurgencies and strengthen the
governments of allied powers within the region, but it is becoming increasingly difficult
to convince populaces under the constant threat of an unseen enemy disrupting daily life
with bouts of random violence that there is any difference between American tactics and
the local warlords.64 There is no easy solution for this dilemma. If the targeted killings
are halted wholesale, the enemy is given opportunity to regroup and handed additional
legitimacy for their actions by being acknowledged victims of a newly disavowed unjust
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practice. If the strikes continue, it will promote “a feeling of anger that coalesces the
population around the extremists,” invalidating the entire operation and prolonging the
conflict.65
Search for Answers
Price of Impunity
The lack of clarity in the strategic picture gives room for anti-drone analysts to
argue against the expanding reliance on UAVs ever increasing operational capabilities.
While the opposition does not argue against technology in war at large, they are worried
that technology is advancing to the point where it is possible to create a UAV with the
processing power to remove humans from the decision processes governing its lethal
duties, essentially dehumanizing warfare and leading to a further disconnect between the
warfighter and the situation developing on the ground.66 A potential paradigm shift of
such magnitude is not around the corner of future UAV development, but it is on the
horizon and drawing closer with every advancement in computing technology. Despite
its relative distance from the present, this fear of humanity allowing technology to hold
the power of life and death over the living is an exceptionally real issue which is a focal
point for questioning the morality of killing with impunity and the effects it has on the
decision process in the use of force.67
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This line of questioning does not dispute drones are an absolutely lethal military
solution. Yet, the consistent sentiment behind every account speaking against the
unrestricted use of drones in the American arsenal does not focus on the technical aspects
of drones. The main thrust of the arguments showcases the loss of humanity both on the
battlefield and within the decision-making process. Traditionally, the humans directly
involved in the killing blow have always had final say in the execution of the order,
always providing a built-in accountability for the decisions of policy makers and a human
face to show the cost of victory or warn of defeat. A retired colonel writing about his
service in Operation Northern Watch recounted the story of the first time he had to fire a
missile in anger as an example of the continued need to for a human to remain “on the
loop” for command decisions.68 After being fired upon by an Iraqi SAM site, his years of
combat training took over and he swiftly prepared to return fire and eliminate the future
threat to his fellow pilots. Yet before he made the final and irrevocable choice to let a
missile loose, he hesitated to pull the trigger as a “momentary flash of the consequences
that lay under my right thumb and the red button it was tensely resting on” passed
through his mind.69 As drones have increased the distance between the battlespace and
combatants, this clear symbol of humanity’s struggle to contain its self-made demons
cannot be allowed to fade from the minds of decision makers preparing to place the lives
of others at risk.
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The fear is that the use of drones will reduce the moment of hesitation across the
whole chain of command leading to the final kill decision as they provide the American
military an overwhelming advantage in protecting its own citizens from harm’s way.70
While this seems like it should universally be treated as a point in favor of their increased
use, the opposition sees it as a grave threat precisely because of the sheer disparity of risk
this introduces between warring factions. This “doctrine of double effect” which “argues
the pursuit of a good end tends to be less acceptable when a resulting harm is directly
intended rather than merely foreseen.”71 Essentially, the argument sees the removal of
the pilot from the battlespace as tipping the scales firmly in the favor of the aggressor in
any risk/reward calculation for conducting an air strike.
In the total war of previous generations, this would be little cause for debate as the
only combatants involved would be uniformed and clearly delineated as legitimate
targets, forcing any unfortunate instances of collateral damage into the realm of
acceptable risks. 21st century battlefields offer no such clarity. Every home is a potential
pillbox. Every citizen a potential combatant. A simple pile of trash could hide an IED
and every corner hides another set of eyes with an instant communication device calling
in fire support. In such a chaotic and lethal battlespace, there is no efficient way for the
warfighter to sort through all this information before making a snap decision to save their
unit or slay an innocent bystander. Combined with the instant connection of the
battlespace to the world’s news outlets through social media, this creates an incredibly
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dangerous situation for the warfighter to navigate as every choice will be analyzed and
judged by prying eyes safely out of combat.
Drones’ promise of a detached observer granting the warfighter insight into the
murky waters of the 21st century warfare is a double-edged sword which risks creating a
false sense of security which will only promote conflict. Rather than limiting the damage
of such situations by making it easier for warfighters to analyze the situation, the fear is
that these situations will become more and more common, increasing the amount of
collateral damage even as weapons become more precise. With a drone’s ability to loiter
over target areas and confirm the targets without risk to the lives of its pilot, the age-old
considerations that go into the decision to use military force may begin to fade into the
background of the all-important political debate. Instead of exhausting all reasonable
options before making the fateful decision to engage in combat operations, the simplicity
of unmanned warfare risks being too alluring for policy makers seeking to secure their
own nation’s interests without working towards a peaceful compromise which may be
more difficult but will preserve lives.72
Finding the Humanity in Robotic Warriors
An Approximate Reality
When presented with the choice between protecting her own citizens with a nextgeneration technology or exposing them to danger in order to preserve the lives of an
enemy’s own citizens, America’s position was made clear most dramatically on August
6, 1945 with the bombing of Hiroshima and reaffirmed with deployment of stealth planes

72

Ibid., Chap. 4-7.

PERCEPTION IS EVERYTHING

30

into the heart of downtown Baghdad. The solution will never be the abandonment of
technological progress, that “genie has been let out of the bottle.”73 The chief concern of
the American people must now be focused on ensuring the decision to use military force
is the last resort. Not only for the sake of her own people, but as the leader of the Free
World, the United States must be the model for future drone operations in an ever more
unstable world. The most common exposure for the rapidly automating force being
COIN operations run to maintain stability across the far reaches of the world.
The key factor to consider is the scope of a twenty-first century COIN operations.
The battlefield will not be restricted by lines on a map and wars will not be won by
killing radicalized farmers who have never even seen the outside of their villages.
Changing the perception of the local populace to view the insurgent forces as the agents
which brought the wrath of the civilized world down upon them is a necessary
component to achieving a lasting peace. To do this, there must be a greater visible
commitment on the part of the American military to support the local populace in the
aftermath of a drone strike.74 By seizing the initiative and delivering a strong message of
strength against lawless action, it will delegitimize the insurgent narrative that senseless
violence is the only holy path to victory. To accomplish this, the U.S. must be willing to
commit to a long-term military and economic presence in unstable regions with the endgoal of tying the local government’s interests to those shared by the United States such as
integration into the global economy and ensuring regional security. A clean fast conflict,
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like the first Gulf War, is not the norm and should not be assumed to be the outcome of a
global superpower’s operations against non-state actors and failing states. The role of
drones in this style of generational conflict should be to act as the iron fist within the
velvet glove of human interaction, reaching out to destroy threats when peaceful
discourse fails.
The one definitive aspect of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’ future is they have
finally secured for themselves an irrevocable place as a vital piece in America’s military
inventory. Though the path was fraught with pitfalls, setbacks, and defeat, no sword can
be used in battle unless it is first tempered by fire. The aerial torpedoes of the World
Wars paved the way for the coming revolution in aerial technology with early attempts at
unmanned guided bombardment, ultimately developing into the Aphrodite bombers
which earned the attentions of U.S. Army Air Force high command. Through hard won
lessons and tedious research, drones were developed further in their fight alongside
American forces over the skies of Southeast Asia, proving their worth as viable
alternatives to manned aircraft on dangerous reconnaissance missions. After yet another
military drawdown and interruption of unmanned research, UAVs had to patiently wait
on another rebirth with the demonstration of complementary technologies in the Gulf
War finally bringing about an unmanned weapon which could distance the living from
the battlespace. Now entering the global stage as a rapidly maturing weapon system, the
eyes of the world are fixed on UAV operations, fearfully scrutinizing their actions,
expecting drones will live up to the high moral standards to which Americans hold their
military forces. All indications from history show drones have earned their place as

PERCEPTION IS EVERYTHING
integral tools in the ever-vigilant arsenal of democracy and will faithfully carryout this
sacred duty.
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